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ABSTRACT
Recent research has documented a positive relationship between tariffs and growth in the late
nineteenth century.  Such a correlation does not establish a causal relationship between tariffs and growth,
but it is tempting to view the correlation as constituting evidence that protectionist or inward-oriented
trade strategies were successful during this period.  This paper argues that such a conclusion is
unwarranted and that the tariff-growth correlation should be interpreted with care.  First, several
individual country experiences in the late nineteenth century are not consistent with the view that import
substitution promoted growth.  For example, the two most rapidly expanding, high tariff countries of the
period ￿ Argentina and Canada ￿ grew because capital imports helped stimulate export-led growth in
agricultural staples products, not because of protectionist trade policies.  Second, most land-abundant
countries (such as Argentina and Canada) imposed high tariffs to raise government revenue, and revenue
tariffs have a different structure than protective tariffs.  The fact that labor-scarce, land-abundant countries
had a high potential for growth and also tended to impose high revenue-generating tariffs confounds the
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 Immediately following World War II, many economists believed that a trade policy
based on import substitution would best promote economic development.  Subsequent
experience instead revealed the costs of protectionism (Krueger 1997).  In the late nineteenth
century as well, many political economists (such as Friedrich List) advocated import tariffs to
promote the growth of domestic manufacturing in countries that were behind the industrial
leader, then the United Kingdom.  But unlike the recent period, the late nineteenth century
experience is often interpreted as confirming the wisdom of import substitution.  Writing in the
Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Bairoch (1989, p. 69) concluded that ￿protectionism
[equaled] economic growth and expansion of trade; liberalism [equaled] stagnation in both￿ in
the late nineteenth century.  Recent work by O￿Rourke (2000) and Clemens and Williamson
(2001) has strengthened this impression by finding a positive correlation between import tariffs
and economic growth across countries from 1875 to 1914. 
Such a correlation does not establish a causal relationship between tariffs and growth, but
it is tempting to view the correlation as constituting evidence that protectionist or inward-
oriented trade strategies were successful during this period.  This paper argues that such a
conclusion is unwarranted and that the tariff-growth correlation should be interpreted with great
care.  First, several individual country experiences in the late nineteenth century are not
consistent with the view that import substitution promoted growth.  For example, the two most
rapidly expanding, high tariff countries of the period ￿ Argentina and Canada ￿ grew because
capital imports helped stimulate export-led growth in agricultural staples products, not because
of protectionist trade policies.  -2-
1  The core includes most of Western Europe as well as Argentina, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, and the United States.  The eleven low-income countries of the periphery are
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Japan, China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, and Mexico. 
GDP data are from Maddison (2001).  
2  Other trade policy instruments, such as import quotas, voluntary export restraints, and
antidumping duties, were rarely employed during this period.  But this tariff measure is a crude
indicator of trade policy because it provides no information on the structure of protection across
industries or sectors. 
Second, most land-abundant countries (such as Argentina and Canada) imposed high
tariffs to raise government revenue, and revenue tariffs have a different structure than protective
tariffs.  The fact that labor-scarce, land-abundant countries had a high potential for growth and
also tended to impose high revenue-generating tariffs confounds the inference that high tariffs
were responsible for their strong economic performance during this period. 
I.  The Tariffs-Growth Relationship: Country Evidence 
Figures 1 presents the unconditional relationship between the average tariff in 1870 and
the average annual growth in real per capita GDP from 1870 to 1913 for 17 high-income ￿core￿
countries.
1  Average tariffs, calculated by dividing customs revenue by the value of imports, are
the most frequently used indicator of trade policy for this period.
2  For these core countries, the
correlation between tariffs and growth is 0.68, but a causal interpretation of this correlation is
questionable.  
First, the correlation is driven by several key outliers:  Argentina, Canada, and the United
States stand out as high tariff, high growth countries.  Without these three countries, the
correlation falls to 0.08.  These labor-scarce, land-abundant New World economies had the
potential for rapid growth that other European countries did not possess.  For example, it is-3-
doubtful that the Netherlands could have achieved growth rates equal to those of the New World
economies simply by imposing a higher tariff.
Second, the core sample may be too limited.  Figure 2 adds eleven low-income periphery
countries to the sample.  The inclusion of countries such as Portugal and Brazil, which had high
tariffs but poor growth performance, reduces the tariff-growth correlation from 0.68 to 0.20 (or
from 0.08 to -0.09 if Argentina, Canada, and the United States are excluded).  
Third, a descriptive analysis of the high tariff, high growth outliers suggests that tariffs
did not play a major role in their economic development in the late nineteenth century.  For
example, Argentina achieved the highest recorded rate of growth in per capita income during this
period and had very high average tariffs.  But its trade policy was not designed to foster inward-
oriented development and its growth was not based on industrialization achieved through import
substitution.  Argentina grew rapidly because it experienced an investment boom that led to an
export boom in staple products.  Argentina received massive foreign investment (particularly
from Britain) in the 1880s that resulted in the construction of thousands of kilometers of railroad
track and other infrastructure-related public works.  This literally paved the way for an enormous
expansion in exports, particularly wheat and livestock.  As CortØs Conde (1993, p.75) explains,
the ￿growth which changed Argentina was based on the exploitation of staples:  agricultural and
cattle products which found an outlet in international markets.￿  
Argentina￿s tariff code was not designed to promote industrialization based on import
substitution and ￿industrial growth did not stem from protectionist tariffs￿ (CortØs Conde 1993,-4-
3  Solberg (1987, p. 106) notes that ￿Although some Argentine industries did enjoy
marked tariff protection, no government during the 1880-1930 period attempted a consistent
protectionist policy to spur industrial growth through massive import substitution.￿  
4  Reynolds (1988, p. 88) further observes that ￿manufacturing output [in Argentina]
during this period grew only a little faster than GDP and was linked rather closely with export
expansion.  Meat-packing firms, flour mills, and wool-washing establishments shipped a large
part of their output abroad.  Railroad construction and repair, other export-oriented infrastructure
facilities, and housing and urban facilities for immigrants also provided a stimulus to
manufacturing.￿
p. 68).
3  As a by-product of the expansion of agricultural exports, complementary activities both
in manufacturing (food processing) and in services (transportation and construction) arose and
absorbed an increasing share of the labor force.  Capital investments were direct toward activities
that would develop, facilitate, and service the agricultural exports and were not undertaken to
produce goods domestically in replace of imports.  Thus, ￿manufacturing growth came mainly
from export expansion plus growth of the domestic market, with import substitution playing a
minor role￿ (Reynolds 1985, p. 88).
4 
Canada was another high tariff country that grew rapidly from 1896 to 1913, but this
growth was not the result of import substitution or an inward-oriented development strategy. 
Like Argentina, Canada experienced ￿a classic investment boom, a major part of it related
directly or indirectly to the settlement of the west. . . . that the settlement of the west was based
on the expectation, in the minds of the settlers, of there being a viable [international] market for
wheat is beyond doubt￿ (Urquhart 1986, pp. 35-36).  Substantial investment in railroads (such as
the Canadian Pacific Railroad extending into the prairies) in the 1880s made possible an export
boom in its staple products, particularly wheat and flour.  Industrialization was not critical to its
growth; indeed, during the period of its most rapid growth from 1891 to 1911, the share of the-5-
labor force in Canadian industry (manufacturing and construction) was unchanged (Urguhart
1993, pp. 24, 305).  
Thus, two high tariff countries did grow rapidly, but export-led growth is a better
description of their development process than import substitution.  What about the link between
tariffs and growth in other countries?  In the United States, high tariffs on manufactured goods
originally imposed during the Civil War were kept in place after the war, but the United States
overtook Britain in terms of per capita income primarily by improving its productivity in the
service sector, not in manufacturing (Broadberry 1998, Irwin 2001).  In Western Europe, Figure 1
suggests that the variation in tariff levels as well as the differences in growth performance were
relatively small, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions.   
Australia is an interesting case to consider.  At first glance, Australia has characteristics
similar to Argentina and Canada ￿ an agricultural exporter with high tariffs, abundant land, and
scarce labor.  But unlike the others, Australia grew slowly during this period, perhaps due to the
fact that its share of employment in agriculture was already low by 1870 and therefore the
possibility of growth through structural change was limited.  Australia is also intriguing because
each of the several colonies there pursued independent trade policies before Federation in 1901. 
The two largest colonies, New South Wales and Victoria, adopted different tariff policies: New
South Wales eschewed tariffs and embraced free trade, while Victoria imposed protectionist
tariffs to promote manufacturing.  The outcome of this experiment suggests that tariffs were not
decisive:  as measured by the level or the growth of per capita GDP, economic performance in
the colonies was not all that different (Haig 2001). 
Some countries did pursue import substitution policies during this period.  In Russia, for-6-
5  The tariffs are commonly believed to have given certain manufacturers significant
market power, to the possible detriment of other manufacturing industries.  Gregory (1994, pp.
60-61) states that ￿there is no evidence of discretionary tariffs to favor specific industries or to
encourage foreign industries to locate behind Russian tariff walls.  Manufacturing inputs were
taxed at the same rates as manufacturers.￿  
example, ￿this process of import substitution and export promotion was actively fostered by the
government through tariff protection, government orders, location of railways and the railway
rate structure, and export premiums￿ and ￿was particularly dramatic for cotton fibre, copper,
steel, cloth and many types of machinery,￿ according to Dohan (1991, p. 215).  Russia grew
rapidly after the 1880s, but doubts remain about the degree to which the tariff protection helped
manufacturing overall.
5  Mexico also imposed high tariffs and brought about ￿substantial import
substitution, particularly in textiles, clothing, processed foods and beverages, tobacco, cement,
and other building materials￿ (Reynolds 1985, p. 100).  Whether restrictive trade policies were
responsible for the strong growth is still open to question. 
Thus, the relationship between trade policy and economic performance is a complicated
issue that cannot be inferred from a simple correlation alone.  As Morris and Adelman (1989, p.
1420) conclude, ￿success along this inward-oriented growth path varied greatly [in the late
nineteenth century] . . . . in moderately backward, import-substituting countries protection levels
varied greatly and did not systematically accelerate economic growth . . . . In sum, the effects of
tariff policies are complex and vary greatly across countries in ways depending strongly on
resources, institutions, and government strategies.￿ 
II.  What Explains the High Tariffs?
Why did export-oriented countries such as Argentina levy high tariffs if they did not-7-
6  As Platt (1972, p. 78) writes with respect to Argentina and other Latin American
countries, ￿each of the Republics was feeling the pressure for more revenue, and for each,
governed as it was by a landed oligarchy with a rooted distaste for direct taxation, the only
obvious source of increased revenue was taxation on a larger import trade. . . . A system of
federal inland revenue was not developed in Argentina until as late as 1891, and in the mid-￿90s
the Customs House was accounting for between 70 and 80 percent of federal government
revenues.￿ As Solberg (1987, p. 106) notes,￿the political base for a reorientation of Argentine
economic policy toward protected industrialization did not exist [prior to World War I], for the
pampa landed elite agreed with farmers as well as urban consumers that protectionism in an
export-oriented economy would raise the cost of rural production and reduce aggregate real
incomes.￿  
employ them as part of an import substitution trade strategy?  In many cases, import duties were
primarily designed to raise fiscal revenue for the government.  Figure 3 illustrates that labor-
scarce, land-abundant countries often relied on customs duties to generate a large proportion of
their government revenue.  Figure 4 shows that these countries also tended to impose high tariffs. 
Land abundant countries tended to impose high tariffs for public finance and for political
economy reasons.  In terms of public finance, import taxes made sense for countries with low
population densities.  Other means of raising revenue (excise taxes, land taxes, income taxes,
etc.) were not as feasible or as enforceable in countries with a widely dispersed population,
particularly in the late nineteenth century.  The taxation of foreign goods arriving into the
nation￿s ports reduced the problem of tax compliance.  In terms of political economy, if a
majority of the population owns land (or if the government is controlled by landowners), they
may have an interest in avoiding direct taxes on land in favor of high taxes on imported luxury
goods.
6
 Revenue tariffs can be structured quite differently from protective tariffs and were not
necessarily designed to protect domestic producers from foreign competition.  Revenue tariffs are
often levied on just a few key commodities (such as alcoholic beverages, coffee and tea, sugar-8-
and tobacco), but are capable of raising more revenue than broadly based tariffs designed to
protect domestic producers.  In the case of Argentina, import duties on most capital goods and
intermediate products related to the production and exports of staples entered duty free (such as
machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, etc.), whereas imported consumption items (sugar, wine,
etc.) were heavily taxed.  The United Kingdom pursued a policy of free trade and did not use the
tariff to discriminate in favor of domestic producers, but still levied import duties on non-
competing goods (such as sugar, tea, and coffee) and on other goods (tobacco manufactures) to
balance domestic taxes on producers (Irwin 1993).
Thus, high tariff measures (customs revenue divided by imports) are an imperfect
indicator of a country￿s trade-policy orientation and may not always reflect protectionist policies. 
Despite high measured tariffs, both Argentina and Canada ranked among the most open
economies in the world in 1913, according to Estevadeordal￿s (1997) factor-endowment-based
indicators of ￿openness￿ to trade.
III.  Conclusions
This paper has questioned whether the correlation between tariffs and growth in the late
nineteenth century by itself tells us anything about the relationship between trade policy and
economic growth.  Rapid growth in Argentina and Canada ￿ two high tariff, high growth outliers
￿ was based on an export-orientation in staple products, not industrialization based on import
substitution.  Labor-scarce and land-abundant countries such as Argentina and Canada often used
import tariffs as a means of raising government revenue.  But those attributes (as well as sound
political institutions and other economic policies) also gave those countries unusually favorable-9-
prospects for economic growth.  Rather than higher tariffs causing higher growth, the
relationship could be spurious: land-abundant countries relied on customs duties to raise
government revenue and also enjoyed favorable growth prospects, with little link between the
two.  -10-
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Figure 4: Average Tariffs and Relative Land Abundance in 1890